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This paper concerns the problem of abstraction: whether when we en- 
counter several exemplars of a concept, we retain only the abstracted con- 
cept, only the exemplars, or both. Although many studies concur that both 
are stored, a recent article argued strongly that only the abstracted concept 
is stored. The present study, aimed at replication of this recent finding, 
follows the earlier procedural details but adds appropriate controls and uses 
simpler material. A set of 24 exemplars of four concepts, in the form of 
four-tuples of letters and numbers, was presented to Ss who, after presenta- 
tion, rated a larger set of exemplars for recognition. One group of Ss experi- 
enced the conceptual exemplars; control group Ss experienced items that 
were similar in composition but not exemplars of a concept. Two major 
results appeared: Unlike the study on which this was based, all Ss were 
able to distinguish those items that were originally experienced from those 
that were not. And, the more completely an exemplar fit the concept (the 
longer the item), the more confident the S was that it had been presented. 
In contrast, in the control condition, the longer the item, the more con- 
fident the S was that it had not been presented earlier. Two models are 
described to account for these results. One is based on the S’s initial storage 
of the exemplars in a concept-plus-correction format; the other is based 
on a procedure whereby the S can make recognition judgments without 
having previously abstracted and retained the concepts. 
This paper concerns the age-old problem of abstraction. There are 
two fundamental questions that learning theorists have asked regarding 
abstraction: (1) what are the processes by which general principles are 
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abstracted from experience with different exemplars; and (2) what 
specific information is retained regarding the exemplars themselves? 
This paper is concerned with the second question, the retention of 
exemplar information. 
The extreme positions on this question, of course, are that either every- 
thing or nothing is retained about each exemplar. Both approaches as- 
sume that the abstract principle is learned. The “retain everything” posi- 
tion is incorporated by several induction programs developed in artificial 
intelligence research on pattern recognition (Hunt, Marin, & Stone, 
1966; Nilsson, 1965; Sebestyen, 1965). These programs accumulate com- 
plete information on many different instances in the process of calculating 
a decision rule to classify the instances. The “retain nothing” position 
has been expressed in the writings of Bartlett ( 1932)) Oldfield ( 1954), 
and others. This position states that only general principles or “schema” 
are abstracted from S’s experience with exemplars and retained, and that 
the exemplar information is lost when assimilated into the schema. 
The truth doubtless lies between these extremes: Along with the 
general principle, Ss probably retain some but not all of the exemplar 
information. This outcome is clear in studies on memory for dot patterns 
(Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; Strange, Keeney, Kessel, & Jenkins, 1970). 
For example, Posner and Keele (1968) taught their Ss to classify distor- 
tions of several “prototype” concepts defined by a pattern of dots in a 
matrix. They later tested retention by noting how Ss categorized old dis- 
tortions of the prototypes, new distortions, and the prototypes themselves. 
Since Ss categorized the prototype patterns as accurately as the old 
distortions, it was concluded that they had inferred the abstract schema 
from the set of exemplars. However, Ss also categorized old distortions, 
seen before, more accurately than new distortions, never seen before, 
leading to the conclusion that something about the original, specific in- 
stances was stored. In other words, along with the prototype schema 
some exemplar information had also been stored. 
Recently, however, the “store nothing” position has been argued quite 
forcefully by Bransford and Franks (1971) and Franks and Bransford 
(1971) on the basis of their data. Since our experiment follows the 
line started by Bransford and Franks, their procedure should be de- 
scribed. Their Ss were exposed to many different exemplars generated 
from a simple principle; later, Ss were tested for recognition memory 
for the exemplars presented earlier, for exemplars not presented earlier, 
and for non-exemplars which violated the general principle. The prin- 
ciple for generating exemplars was of the following form: 
S -+ (A) (B) CC) CD) (1) 
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That is, each string was generated by selecting and concatenating one or 
more of the optional elements A, B, C, or D. In Bransford and Franks 
( 1971), the elements were “atomic” propositions, and the concatenation 
operation was that of clause embedding in a complex sentence. Suppose, 
for example, that the four atoms were A = The car is old, R = The car 
pulled the trailer, C = The car climbed the hill, and D = The hill was 
steep. Then several exemplar strings generated by Rule I would be 
AC = The old car climbed the hill, BC = The car pulling the trailer 
climbed the hill, and ABCD = The old car pulling the trailer climbed 
the steep hill. There are 2 * - 1 = 15 “legal” strings generated by this 
rule from the four atoms, and about half of these were presented to the 
Ss in the Bransford and Franks experiment. Moreover, their Ss were 
exposed concurrently to four such sets of exemplars (i.e., the atomic 
elements, A to D, differed among sets; each set called a concept), all 
intermixed in scrambled order. The Ss did not know during presentation 
that retention of the specific exemplars would be tested. 
Two primary results were yielded by the recognition memory tests in 
the Bransford and Franks experiment. First, their Ss were completely 
unable to discriminate between presented versus nonpresented exemplars 
of the concepts, although they accurately rejected illegal test strings 
which violated the concepts, e.g., “The new car followed the trailer down 
the hill.” Second, Ss’ ratings of confidence in recognition were higher 
the greater the number of elements in the legal test string. In fact, the 
string ABCD evoked the highest recognition confiidence rating (of having 
been presented) despite the fact that no four-element string had ever 
been presented during the initial exposure. The conclusions, then, are 
that Ss remember only general concepts (e.g., Rule 1 applied to certain 
sets of elements), not the particular exemplars, and that a “recognition 
rating” reflects the proximity of the test string to the full-form of the 
concept. This second finding was neither expected nor satisfactorily ex- 
plained by Bransford and Franks (1971). 
A few factors in the Bransford and Franks design militate against 
accepting the conclusion that Ss usually retain only schema and not the 
particular exemplars. One problem is that memory must be overloaded 
when the S is exposed concurrently to seven or eight exemplars of each 
of four different concepts, and is then asked to remember which specific 
combinations of elements occurred, e.g., that AC and ABC occurred 
but AB did not. The overloading might have been even more severe be- 
cause each element was itself a full sentence and contained peripheral 
syntactical information. Too, in formal terms, judgments of which specific 
combinations of elements within a concept had occurred should exhibit 
massive amounts of interference due to the formal overlap and similarity 
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of the exemplars (as well as the similarities among the different con- 
cepts). These remarks argue that the Bransford and Franks materials 
and procedures may have arranged conditions in such manner as to cause 
massive forgetting of the particular exemplars. 
Also, the Bransford and Franks experiment was missing a “non- 
concept” control group of Ss. Subjects in such a group would be ex- 
posed to a series of overlapping strings constructed not by applying Rule 
1 to certain ordered sets of elements, but by randomly selecting and 
combining elements from a small unordered set of elements. If these Ss 
also later failed to distinguish between presented and nonpresented 
strings, one might then interpret the earlier findings in terms of the 
interference and overloading of memory in the situation rather than in 
the forgetting of the particular exemplars when they are assimilated into 
a schema. 
The Noncases which Bransford and Franks’ Ss rejected-and which 
were offered as evidence for their having learned something-were 
semantic deviates of the atomic propositions. But the issue is not whether 
the basic elements of the concept were stored; both theories, the “retain 
everything” and the “retain nothing” theory, suppose that they would 
be. Even a control group presented with random combinations should 
be able to reject test sentences composed of atomic propositions which 
deviate in identity from those heard earlier. The important issue re- 
quiring demonstration is retention of specific combinations of atoms, not 
retention of the atoms themselves. In this regard, then, Bransford and 
Franks failed to demonstrate that their Ss retained anything beyond the 
atomic propositions. This was perhaps to be expected, since in their 
experiment each atomic proposition was presented many times (2-6) 
during the study phase and many times during the recognition testing 
series, whereas a specific combination of atoms (e.g., ABD) would occur 
at most once. 
For such reasons, we decided to repeat the essentials of the Bransford 
and Franks (1971) procedure but to use simpler learning materials and 
to include an appropriate control condition. 
METHOD 
The Bransford and Franks procedure was replicated with the follow- 
ing main exceptions. First, the type of material differed; elements con- 
sisted of letters and digits, although strings were generated by Rule 1. 
Second, each string was presented only once for acquisition and tested 
only once for recognition. Finally, Ss in two control groups experienced 
material that was identical in elemental composition, but different in the 
existence or obviousness of concepts. 
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The experimental session was divided into an acquisition session fol- 
lowed by an unexpected recognition test. Acquisition was done in the 
guise of testing S’s short-term memory for the exemplar strings. On an 
acquisition trial, the S read aloud a single string which was presented in 
the window of a memory drum for 2 sec. The drum then turned to a 
three-digit number from which S subtracted threes aloud as rapidly as 
he could. After 10 set of subtracting, he attempted to recall the string. 
After a lo-set recall period, the next item and three-digit number were 
presented. This procedure continued until 24 strings were presented, 
eight of each of three different concepts. 
For the recognition session, the S received a sheet listing either 45 or 
65 items, depending on his particular condition, He marked each item 
on a scale from - 5 to +5, the -5 indicating a judgment that the item 
clearly had not been presented, and the +5 that the item clearly had 
been presented. 
There were three conditions. In the first two conditions, the acquisition 
strings were exemplars of three concepts, Rule 1 applied to three differ- 
ent sets of elements. For example, for the concept in which Rule 1 is ap- 
plied to the elements 1234, the 15 legal exemplars are: 1234, 123, 124, 
134, 234, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34, 1, 2, 3, and 4. The first two conditions 
differed in the obviousness of the concepts and presumably in the dif- 
ficulty of acquiring them. Condition Ob, the Obvious concept condition, 
involved concepts such as 1234, ABCD, and wxyz. Condition Df, the 
Difficult concept condition, involved concepts such as 41AB, SyzD, and 
w2Cx. The 12 elements in the Obvious condition were mixed to form the 
three Difficult concepts. 
During acquisition, the Ss in Conditions Ob and Df experienced eight 
of the strings generated by Rule 1 applied to each of the three concepts. 
Half of the possible one-, two-, three-, and four-tuples were presented. 
For recognition, all 45 legal items (15 X 3 concepts) were presented, 
plus 20 illegal items, Fifteen of the 20 illegal items were constructed by 
using the elements from within a single set but by violating their cus- 
tomary left-right order. For the concept 1234, item 143 exemplifies an 
order violation, Five of the 20 illegal items were composed by selecting 
elements from different sets and violating their customary order. Given 
1234, ABCD, and wxyz as concepts, items such as 12BA and 41x are 
examples of double violations. The legal items presented in acquisition 
are called OLD items; the matching half of the legal items not presented, 
NEW:LEGAL items; and the two kinds of violation items, NEW: 
ILLEGAL( ORDER) and NEW: ILLEGAL( ORDER and SET), 
respectively. 
In the third condition, the Random condition (R), neither concepts 
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nor rules existed. The 12 elements from Conditions Ob and Df were ran- 
domly grouped, with the restriction that the acquisition and recognition 
sets include the same number of one-, two-, three-, and four-tuple strings 
as in the first two conditions. 
The entire experiment was replicated three times, each time with a 
new set of 12 elements. Thirty-six Ss, 12 per Condition, from the de- 
partmental pool of paid Ss participated individually in the experiment. 
All were Stanford University students; half were female and half were 
male, balanced over the three conditions. Each S was paid $1.75 for the 
single-hour session. 
RESULTS 
Each S in Conditions Ob and Df made 65 judgments of recognition, 
scores ranging from - 5 to +5. Those in Condition R produced only 45 
judgments, due to the absence of possible NEW : ILLEGAL items. Where 
appropriate these scores were separated into the four item categories: 
OLD, NEW: LEGAL, NEW : ILLEGAL( ORDER), and NEW : IL- 
LEGAL( ORDER and SET). A n average rating was calculated for items 
of equal length within each category for each S. Two analyses of 
variance were then applied to these average scores. The first assessed 
(OLD versus NEW: LEGAL) X (Conditions Ob, Df, and R) X (Length 
of item, l-4) ; the second assessed (Kind of NEW item) x (Conditions 
Ob and Df) X (Length of item, 2-4). 
The primary results are shown in Fig. 1, one panel for each condition. 
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FIG. 1. Recognition confidence ratings for OLD and legal and illegal NEW items 
of various lengths for three conditions. 
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A first, strong result is that Ss discriminate well between OLD items seen 
previously and NEW:LEGAL items that fit the rule but were not seen 
previously. This contrast was very significant overall (F( 1,33) = 224.05, 
p < .Ol) and was present in each condition. There was no significant 
main effect for the Length of the test string, but there was an interesting 
interaction between Length and Condition (F( 233) = 5.76, p < .Ol). 
We will say more about this interaction later. Compared across the three 
panels of Figure 1, the overall level of ratings seen to be somewhat lower 
for Condition R (F( 2,33) = 4.14, p < .OS) which is itself of little in- 
terest. The several kinds of NEW items were rated quite differently 
(F( 2,33) = 56.99, p < .Ol); NEW:LEGAL strings were rated highest 
followed by NEW: ILLEGAL( ORDER) strings, and then by NEW: 
ILLEGAL( ORDER and SET) strings. There is also an interaction be- 
tween kind of NEW item and Condition (F( 2,44) = 10.77, p < .Ol), re- 
flecting lower ratings for NEW items in Condition Ob. 
A more detailed analysis was performed on the function relating con- 
fidence ratings to the length of the test item, and how this relationship 
varied across conditions. For this purpose, a linear trend component from 
a one-way analysis of variance was computed for each S’s judgments of 
items of various lengths, one trend component for each of the four cate- 
gories. The trend component was then assigned to each S as his score for 
that kind of item. The scores were then tested for difference from zero.3 
This test assesses the relationship between the item lengths and ratings, 
without involving the large variances between Ss. This test indicates 
which of the 10 lines in Figure 1 have slopes significantly different from 
zero. 
Accordingly, those lines in Fig. 1 that have a reliable nonzero slope 
are marked with a single asterisk if significant beyond the .05 level, or 
a double asterisk if beyond the .Ol level. Furthermore, the slopes of the 
lines for OLD and NEW :LEGAL items in Condition Ob were compared, 
respectively, with those corresponding lines in Condition R and found 
to be significantly different (t(OLD) = 3.16; t( NEW) = 7.52, each 
p < .Ol, d.f. = 11). 
In sum, Ss appeared not only able to abstract the rules which generated 
the items (that is, NEW: LEGAL > NEW: ILLEGAL), but also able to 
retain the specific items seen (OLD > NEW). With an obvious rule to 
generate the items, the longer the test item, the more confident the S 
was that he had seen it before (Condition Ob, lines sloping upward). 
When there was no rule, the longer the test item, the more certain the S 
3 As suggested by J. E. Keith Smith, personal communication. A discussion of 
the linear trend component analysis can be found in Winer ( 1962). 
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was that he had not seen it before (Condition R, lines sloping down- 
ward). When there was a rule to generate the items but it was difficult 
(Condition Df), there was no regular overall relationship between item 
length and recognition ratings. 
Since Ss in Condition Ob produced a positive relationship and Ss in 
Condition R a negative one, it is probable that Condition Df represents 
some mixture of these effects. This mixture may occur within Ss or be- 
tween Ss. Since the variance of the trend scores is larger for Condition 
Df than for Conditions Ob and R, the mixture is more likely between Ss. 
About half of the Ss may have noticed the concepts and rules, behaving 
as Ss in Condition Ob, while the remainder may not have noticed the 
rules, behaving as Ss in Condition R. For this reason, discussion will 
involve only the “pure” results from Conditions Ob and R. 
DISCUSSION 
The experiment was designed around three questions: Does S retain 
for long the particular experiences that he abstracts into concepts? How 
do his judgments of recognition differ when he has acquired a concept 
versus when he has merely experienced a list of similar items? Why do 
Ss recognize complete instances of concepts with greater confidence than 
incomplete ones? These questions will be discussed below in that order. 
Is there specific memory for the experiences that were abstracted into 
concepts? From the results of this study and those reviewed other than 
Bransford and Franks, we may conclude that there is some specific mem- 
ory for the experiences that were abstracted into concepts. The material 
and procedures in the Bransford and Franks studies would appear to be 
a hindrance to retention of the particular exemplars experienced. Perhaps 
the more accurate emphasis is to view the Bransford and Franks experi- 
ments as demonstrating that conceptual rules may be abstracted and 
retained despite conditions which hinder retention of much information 
about particular experiences. 
Do recognition judgments differ when the experiences are unrelated 
but confusing rather than related by a rule? When Ss had acquired con- 
cepts, the relationship between the length of an item and recognition 
confidence ratings was clearly different from when the Ss were simply 
confused by many similar experiences. The relationship was positive 
when the items were generated by a rule but negative when items were 
similar but not rule generated. 
Why are recogniiton confidence ratings related to the lengths of test 
items? In this as in the Bransford and Franks study, the longer items were 
ones that were more complete instances of the full concept, Thus, this 
question can be rephrased: Why are recognition confidence ratings 
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related to the goodness-of-fit of the test item to the full form concept? 
Below, we develop several plausible answers to this question. 
One theory could be that in learning the items presented, S stores the 
full unit presented, but that tag “generalizes” to subunits of the pattern. 
For example, when presented with the string 134, S would attach tags in 
memory to the elements 1, 3, 4, to the diagrams 13 and 34 (but not 31 
or 43), and to the triplet 134. Later, one could reconstruct with fair 
accuracy from information about subunit frequency which items must 
have been presented earlier. This reconstruction process might be 
detailed as follows. 
Imagine that when S is presented with a test item for recognition, he 
searches his memory for tags associated to the individual elements, to the 
pairs of adjacent elements (digrams) in the test item, to the triplets of 
adjacent elements (trigrams), etc. The confidence rating for an item of 
length n would be computed in n passes. First is a check for recognition 
of single elements. The memory representations of the single elements 
of the test string are examined for frequency of associated tags. If the 
frequency of tags on a given element exceeds a threshold number, we 
say it is “recognized”; otherwise, it is rejected. In this first pass, if any 
element in the string is not recognized, then the entire test string is re- 
jected and given a low rating. (None of these types of strings was in- 
cluded in our experiment.) 
If each individual element is recognized and if the string contains two 
or more elements, then a second pass begins, in which the recognition 
rating will be augmented according to the digrams in the string. The 
memory representation of each digram of the string is consulted for the 
number of tags associated to it, indicating frequency of past occurrence. 
If the number of tags on the digram exceeds a threshold amount, then 
that digram is recognized and a tally is added to a counter for the string. 
If the frequency is below threshold, that digram fails its recognition test 
and a tally is subtracted from the string’s counter. The counter accum- 
ulates tallies across the (n - 1) digrams of the test string. Similarly, if 
the item has three or more elements, a third pass is made to collect tally 
points for the (n - 2) trigrams. The passes continue in like manner until 
tallies are collected for all n-gram sub-units of the string. The final con- 
fidence rating is a linear transformation of the accumulated tally for the 
test string. 
The outcome of this process can be described mathematically. Let ‘p 
denote the probability that a particular n-gram has a training frequency 
(number of tags) sufficient to exceed the threshold for placing a + 1 in 
the tally counter, Then the total tally for a homogeneous string of length 
n is expected to be 
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n-1 FL-1 
c 
(n - 4[P(+l) + (1 - P)(-111 or m - 1) c (n - 4 
i=l i-1 
or (‘p - 5) n (n - 1). This expected tally is increasing when p > .5 
and decreasing when p < .5). For 8s in the rule-generated condition, the 
legal strings are composed only of legal n-grams, and we shall assume 
that for all of them p > .5. Therefore, in the rule condition, the ratings 
for legal strings will have positive slope. By definition, illegal strings 
contain one or more nonoccurring n-grams (for which p = 0), so they 
will therefore have a lower overall tally. 
For the “random non-concept” condition, it would be argued that 
p < 5, yielding a negative slope for the relation between item length 
and recognition rating. In support of this argument, it should be noted 
that since many more different n-grams would occur during training in 
the random condition than in the rule condition, particular n-grams 
will be infrequent and consequently will not be learned very well. In 
terms of the model, there would be more n-grams over which a fixed 
number of frequency tags would be spread; the number of n-grams that 
consequently have a sufficient number of tags to exceed threshold would 
be much lower. 
The separation between OLD and NEW strings in Fig. 1 is rep- 
resented in terms of the value of 13. Frequently occurring n-grams have 
p > .5, infrequently occurring n-grams have 0 < p < .5, and nonoccur- 
ring n-grams have p = 0. This model accounts for most of the data in 
Fig. 1. 
In summary, then, this view is that the conceptual rule per se is not 
learned; rather, the set of training strings generates a certain frequency 
distribution into the memory registers for sub-units, and recognition 
ratings for test strings are computed from these registers. The theory 
could apply in principle to other materials, whether the elements are 
atomic propositions (Bransford & Franks, 1971)) geometric forms in a 
larger picture (Franks & Bransford, 1971), or the locations of dots in 
a matrix (Posner & Keele, 1968). For example, with matrix dot patterns, 
the elementary structural features (corresponding to the n-grams) would 
be a set of “masks” or “templates” for small local regions obtained from 
fragments of the training patterns (cf. Uhr & Vossler, 1963). With 
linguistic material, the basic “n-grams” counted could be embeddings 
of n subject-predicate constructions. 
A statistical decision strategy such as this may explain why it some- 
times appears that S can identify and remember a nonpresented proto- 
type better than presented distortions of the prototype (Posner & Keele, 
1970; Strange, Keeney, Kessel, & Jenkins, 1970). The prototype simply 
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contains a greater total number of frequently presented subunits than 
does any single distortion. For example, if every string of the concept 
ABCD had been presented and stored except for the quadragram itself, 
still ABCD would receive a tally of 4 ( =5 minus 1 for the tag missing 
on the quadragram) whereas the presented trigram ABC would only 
receive a tally of 3. This theory argues then that the storage of particulate 
information is veridical-it is not degraded by assimilation to a proto- 
type. Rather, the later recognition-judgmental process is “biased” or 
“distorted” in the ways indicated. 
The n-gram tally theory above has several difficulties. First, it seems 
unlikely that p, the probability that a particular n-gram exceeds thres- 
hold, is invariant across n, the length of the particular n-gram. For 
example, since at presentation each string is broken down into all subunit 
n-grams and each of those n-grams is tagged, over the entire presentation 
sequence, more digrams will be tagged than quadragrams. Consequently, 
the probability that there will be enough tags to exceed threshold should 
be greater for digrams than for quadragrams. We cannot, therefore, as- 
sume p to be the same for both short and long n-grams. An augmented 
model accommodates these differing probabilities. The expected total 
tally for any one test string of length n would be 
12-l n-1 
c 
(72 - i)[pi(+l) + (1 - pi)(-111 or c (n - i)(2Pi - 1). 
i=l i=l 
From the above argument, it is expected that for i < i, pi > pi. The 
resulting tally would have a positive slope only when 
n-1 
c 
n-1 
Pi>21 
i=l 
negative slope when 
n-1 
c 
n-l 
pi<27 
i=l 
and be zero otherwise, for n being the length of the longest item. 
The augmented model now presents another di5culty. It must rely 
upon a fortuituous combination of circumstances and threshold settings to 
get the pi’s (or just the p’s in the simpler model) to sum appropriately. 
A third, and more serious di5culty with both the above models is that 
they predict that the S would have to do a great deal of computing to 
construct the concepts if he were asked. The reaction time for produc- 
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tion or recognition of an item which fit the full concept would be un- 
reasonably longer than for any presented subunit. 
The chief alternative theory would suppose that the prototype effect, 
the influence of the proximity of the string to the concept, is a learning 
phenomenon, not a judgmental one. Importantly, after a concept has 
been learned, new presented strings can be identified as the concept plus 
one or another minor distortion or correction. For instance, the string 
ACD could be encoded as “concept ABCD, B missing”; the string AB 
as “concept ABCD, C missing, D missing.” In this way, the prototype 
“concept ABCD” would accumulate a high implicit frequency during 
training and so yield higher recognition ratings and show greater re- 
sistance to forgetting than would the specific instances (“corrections”) 
which have lower frequencies. This theory would then predict that the 
S’s later production of the concept should not take a longer time than any 
particular exemplar since it does not have to be calculated from the 
stored information. The basic problem with this approach is its failure 
to specify how the concept or prototype is acquired unless some specific 
particulars are stored about early instances. The intermediate position 
is that particular exemplar information is stored initially until the con- 
ceptual rule is inferred; thereafter, encoding of instances changes so that 
particulate information is no longer entered or maintained. 
This discussion has not so much resolved as restated and recast the 
basic “retain everything” versus “retain nothing” hypotheses about con- 
ceptual induction. We have tried to place in perspective a novel finding 
by Bransford and Franks (1971) which appeared to disprove, or at least 
seriously challenge, one of these theories. A theoretical and experimental 
critique of their findings shows that reports of the demise of the ancient 
problem have been premature: It is still very much alive and kicking. 
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